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Abstract
Boatright and Faust rightly recommend Emerson’s active reading style, but they misrepresent him as
pragmatist who believed readers to be “makers of meaning.” Emerson was a transcendentalist whose
fundamental message was that moral “truth exists, though all men should deny it.” Especially in his
antislavery writings, Emerson teaches two ways for readers to find (not make) these moral truths in
the texts they read: by reading with their souls, or intuitively (“repairing to the lamps”), and by reading for the facts (“raking the language”) that will awaken moral sensibilities. Rather than continue to
invent an Emerson who flatters our contemporary philosophical biases, let’s ponder what Emerson
actually advocates; his transcendental reading lessons may be just the ones that we require.

This article is a response to:
Boatright, M. D. & Faust, M. A. (2013). Emerson, Reading, and Democracy: Reading as Engaged
Democratic Citizenship. Democracy & Education, 21(1). Article 6. Available online at http://democracy
educationjournal.org/home/vol21/iss1/6/

“Books are for the scholar’s idle times.” (Emerson, 1983, p.58)

This sentence—o ne of several Emerson offers in “The
American Scholar” (1837) in response to the question “What is the
right use” of books (p. 57)—is not one that Boatright and Faust
chose to include in their essay about Emerson’s philosophy of
reading, but its irreverence (toward book learning, and humanist
truisms more generally) has charmed many of the late-20th-
century critics upon whom they rely. For critics like Jacobson,
McMillin, and Cavell, all of whom Boatright and Faust enlist as
guides to Emerson’s writings, this irreverent Emerson anticipates
Nietzsche. That great German philosopher who as early as 1873
audaciously defined “truths” as merely those “illusions of which we
have forgotten that they are illusions” (146) was anticipated 30 years
earlier by Emerson, these critics like to say, and together these two
protopostmodernists began to unfix all of the stars in humanism’s
firmament, including the self (“nothing in Emerson is more
constant than his scorn of the idea that any given state of what he
calls the self is the last,” Cavell asserts [3]) and a higher power
(Emerson “dispos[es] . . . God under Man, and affirm[s] human will
as the vehicle of highest reason,” Jacobson contends [18]). Emerson
and Nietzsche, these critics proclaim, led us out of a benighted
world where truths are found and into a brave new one where
truths are made, to recall the postmodern credo Rorty (1989, p. 3)
made famous in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. This or something like it is the grand narrative underlying Boatright and Faust’s
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contention that Emerson’s project is a version of Rorty’s “edifying”
rather than “systematic” philosophy (Rorty, 1989, p. 2).
According to Boatright and Faust (2013), the postmodern, or
what they call pragmatist, Emerson teaches us not only about this
“transient, constantly evolving quality of nature and of society”
(p. 5) but also about the right kind of reading for such a world: that
is, one reads not in search of objective truth but to cultivate
subjective experience or “a flow of thought that varies from reader
to reader” (p. 5). Concerned that the Common Core State
Standards—now adopted by forty-five states and the District of
Columbia—will put “increasing pressure on teachers to standardize learning” and treat “books as closed containers of meaning”
(p. 1), Boatright and Faust recommend an Emerson who advocates
reading “not to know with certainty but to know approximately,
contingently” (p. 2). “Certified knowledge held little interest for
Emerson,” they write, “and the empowering act of reading infused
his own mind and lived experience in order that they might be
transformed or challenged by texts with which he engaged” (p. 4).
Students should of course be taught that reading offers them a
“sense of agency” (p. 4). They should be “dare[d] to read counter to
the assumption that the goal is to arrive at predetermined
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meanings, intentions, or purposes” (p. 4). And Emerson’s moments
of irreverence convey such lessons wonderfully, as when he warned
a young admirer that “reading long at one time anything, no matter
how it fascinates, destroys thought. Do not permit this. Stop if you
find yourself becoming absorbed, at even the first paragraph” (as
cited in Richardson, 1995, pp. 173–74). Obviously, Emerson excelled
in the use of hyperbole, particularly when challenging conformist
platitudes, and Boatright and Faust include in their essay many of
Emerson’s hyperbolic assertions, such as his self-description in
“Circles” (1841) as “an endless seeker.” The full sentence is even
more audacious: “No facts are to me sacred; none are profane; I
simply experiment, an endless seeker, with no Past at my back”
(Emerson, 1983, p. 412).
At the same time, a serious consideration of Emerson as a
model reader in the era of the Common Core State Standards must
also include the much more ubiquitous reverent moments in his
writings. In the case of “Circles,” that reverence comes in the very
next sentence: “Yet this incessant movement and progression
which all things partake could never become sensible to us but by
contrast to some principle of fixture or stability in the soul” (p. 412).
Similarly, Emerson’s quip about books for idle times in “The
American Scholar” comes in this context:
Undoubtedly there is a right way of reading, so it be sternly
subordinated. Man Thinking must not be subdued by his instruments.
Books are for the scholar’s idle times. When he can read God directly,
the hour is too precious to be wasted in other men’s transcripts of their
readings. But when the intervals of darkness come, as come they
must,—when the sun is hid and the stars withdraw their shining,—we
repair to the lamps which were kindled by their ray, to guide our steps
to the East again, where the dawn is. (p. 58)

For Emerson, reading is indeed like thinking, as Boatright
and Faust (2013) point out (3), but both activities lead us not to our
own subjective “growth” or “reform,” as the authors like to claim,
but to “God,” or “the East,” as above, or “the Over-Soul,” or “the
soul,” in so many other essays of his. Good postsectarian public
intellectual that he was, Emerson varies how he describes these
fixed, transcendental truths. His conviction that reading and
thinking lead to such truths, however, never altered. Thinking and
reading are “instruments” that “Man Thinking” (Emerson, 1983,
p. 58) uses to find such transcendental truths as the ensouled self
and the existence of a higher power. Emerson often called these
truths the “higher law” or “moral law.”
A cornerstone of the moral law for Emerson was that our
equality as human beings is based upon our shared transcendental
essence, “the doctrine of the indwelling of the Creator in man,” as
he put it in the 1841 “Lecture on the Times” (Emerson, 1983, p. 167),
and what I call “transcendental equality.” Contrary to Boatright
and Faust’s (2013) assertion that “Emerson offered no program for
ameliorating the ills of society” (p. 2), Emerson dedicated his life to
promoting transcendental equality, not least through 30 years of
antislavery activism, which has been well documented since the
1995 publication of Emerson’s Antislavery Writings. Unfortunately,
too many readers of Emerson still look not to Emerson’s actual
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writings but to the reinterpretation of those writings by Cavell and
a few others, who through the 1980s and 1990s invented a fashionable postmodern Emerson. Theirs is a record of willful misreading
of Emerson’s work, mainly by citing isolated sentences or passages
without regard for their function within Emerson’s larger arguments. In “Emerson’s Politics, Retranscendentalized” (Malachuk,
2011), I document Emerson’s lifelong commitment to transcendental equality and illustrate these critics’ intentional disregard of it.
Here, however, rather than dwell on how Boatright and Faust
unfortunately perpetuate this misinterpretation of Emerson, I will
show (a) how their defense of Emersonian reading as good for
democracy is not (as they argue) because Emerson is a pragmatist
but (as they inadvertently reveal) because Emerson is a transcendentalist and (b) how Emerson (especially in his antislavery
writings) offers two provocative reading lessons that I’m calling
“repairing to the lamps” and “raking the language.”

Transcendentalism and Democracy
Boatright and Faust (2013) may or may not be fair when they
insinuate that the call of the Common Core State Standards for
“‘close reading’ of ‘high-quality’ texts using ‘cogent reasoning’”
bears within it “prevalent assumptions about textual objectivity”
(p. 1) but, in any case, they are right to question such assumptions.
And they are also right to turn to Emerson for help here. Like his
pragmatist heirs, James and Dewey, Emerson in his portraits of
reading shifted our focus from the text to “the power of the mind as
that which exists through constantly reforming its understanding of
the world” (p. 2). Further, reading should teach us not only that we
as individuals are malleable but that democratic societies are as
well; both are, in Boatright and Faust’s nice phrase, “work[s] in
progress” (p. 2). For individuals as well as democracies interested in
growth and reform, reading thus becomes an essential tool “for
producing new ways of thinking and being” (p. 3). Boatright and
Faust then examine three facets of this philosophy: how Emerson’s
creative reading practice entails thinking as a form of action, how
such reading also promotes “healthy” individuals who question
authority, and how such reading is essential to “the health of a
society conceived as constantly forming and reforming itself ” (p. 3).
At this level of abstraction, Boatright and Faust’s account of
Emerson’s philosophy is accurate and useful. However, they dodge
the real question for all of us intrigued by Emerson’s potential
relevance to democracy today, which is, if we choose to follow
Emerson and start thinking of individuals and societies not as fixed
entities but “as constantly forming and reforming” (p. 3), how do
we ensure individuals and societies grow in directions good for
democracy? Boatright and Faust point to Dewey, who also believed
Emerson’s philosophy was good for democracy, but what makes
Dewey right and Winters (another 20th-century commentator
mentioned by the authors) wrong? As the authors note, Winters
worried that Emerson’s democracy would be characterized by (in
their words) “aimless individualism” and (in Winters’s) “‘perfectly
unconscious imbeciles’” (p. 7). Winters’s critique was actually even
more biting. Zeroing in on Emerson’s praise for not just a subjective but an intuitional approach to books and any stimuli, Winters
(1947) accused Emerson of celebrating our “unrevised reactions to
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stimuli.” “Unrevised reactions are mechanical,” Winters reasoned,
and thus Emerson’s “man in a state of perfection is an automaton;
an automatic man is insane. Hence, Emerson’s perfect man is a
madman” (pp. 54–55). Just like Winters, Dewey, in his 1903 tribute
to Emerson as “the philosopher of Democracy,” singled out this
same “reverence [in Emerson] for the instinct and impulse of our
common nature” (pp. 412–413) but not to condemn it. On the
contrary, Dewey praised Emerson for proclaiming this instinctive,
impulsive “idealism” to be as much the province of “the common
man” as of the elites; in so doing, Dewey wrote, Emerson
“restor[ed] to the common man that which . . . has been embezzled
from the common store and appropriated to sectarian and class
use” (p. 411). Indeed, Emerson is “the only Christian [i.e., egalitarian] of the Intellect” (p. 412).
So, in promoting “new ways of thinking and being,” to recall
Boatright and Faust’s (2013) words (p. 3) in our democracy, will
Emersonian reading yield more idealists, as Dewey promised, or
more imbeciles, as Winters charged? Boatright and Faust struggle
to explain why Dewey’s interpretation is correct. They write that
“reading democratically means acknowledging that readers are
situated in a climate and are surrounded by a political landscape in
which they have the responsibility to participate” (p. 7). But what is
the origin of that “responsibility”? In the paeans to subjective
reading that Boatright and Faust have curated—with the help of
Cavell and the others—from Emerson’s oeuvre, they offer only one
example of Emerson answering the question of responsibility. But,
before turning to that example below, let’s first consider the
evidence that Dewey himself provides, which is the real reason he
remains a better reader of Emerson than Winters was. In the 1903
essay, to show that Emerson promotes a moral rather than amoral
idealism, Dewey cites a couple sentences from Emerson’s late essay
“Success” (1870):
It is not . . . new dogmas and the logical exposition of the world that
are our first need, but to watch and continually cherish the intellectual
and moral sensibilities and woo them to stay and make their homes
with us. Whilst they abide with us, we shall not think amiss.
(Emerson,1903–1904,Volume 7, p. 301; as cited by Dewey, p. 412)

What Dewey identified—and Winters missed—in Emerson’s
many celebrations of subjectivity is the “intellectual and moral
sensibilities” that guide this subjectivity: Emerson likens these
sensibilities in “Success” to important houseguests. What Dewey
(the pragmatist) neglected to include, though, is a later passage
from “Success,” where Emerson (the transcendentalist) contends
finally that these sensibilities are not just houseguests but the house
itself:
But the inner life sits at home . . .’ T is a quiet, wise perception. It loves
truth, because it is itself real; it loves right, it knows nothing else . . .
This tranquil, well-founded, wide-seeing soul . . . lies in the sun and
broods on the world. (Volume 7, p. 311).

What Winters did not grasp at all and Dewey only partially
grasped is that Emerson believed our subjectivity—and our
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reading—to be housed within a moral soul. Each reader is indeed
“situated” (Boatright & Faust, 2013, p. 7)—not in a “climate” or a
“political landscape” but in a “tranquil, well-founded, wide-seeing
soul.” Therefore, while Boatright and Faust (2013) are right to side
with Dewey (rather than Winters) and contend that the “flow of . . .
thought” that “varies from reader to reader . . . should never be
perceived as random but rather as generative” (p. 5), they are wrong
to eschew Dewey’s partial and Emerson’s complete explanation why
this is so: that is, each reader generates ideal rather than imbecilic
thoughts because he or she has a soul.
In fact, like Cavell and the others, Boatright and Faust
studiously avoid Emerson’s transcendentalist explanations, as their
one example shows. Emerson, Boatright and Faust (2013) argue,
believed like Nietzsche that “a stagnant mind is a sick mind and the
antidote to that sickness is to awaken to the transient, constantly
evolving quality of nature and of society” (p. 5). What they skip over
is that Nietzsche’s “healthy” society was hardly democratic; as
Levine (2011) explains in a recent essay that will hopefully end the
specious equating of these two thinkers, “The great moral difference between Emerson and Nietzsche is that. . . . Nietzsche
sacrifices the mass of mankind to promote a new race of Over-men
[while] Emerson wants everyone to tap into the eternal Over-soul”
(p. 257). Perhaps Boatright and Faust sensed “health” is not enough,
for they quickly offer a quotation from Emerson that refers to
“ethics and humanity” (p. 5), too, as guides to the direction of our
growth. That passage is from Emerson’s “Power” in the 1860 The
Conduct of Life. Here, they argue by way of Wider (2000), we see
Emerson reject “‘an intellectual free-for-all’” (Boatright & Faust,
2013, p. 5) and instead introduce an “ethical dimension to reading”
(p. 5). Here is the passage from “Power”:
Everything good in nature and the world is in that moment of
transition, when the swarthy juices still flow plentifully from nature,
but their astringency or acridity is got out by ethics and humanity.
(Emerson, 1983, p. 980, as cited by Boatright & Faust, 14–15)

Boatright and Faust are right that this passage shows
“Emerson understood that there is an ethical dimension to
reading” (p. 5), but they fail to elaborate upon it and instead race off
to a different passage from a different essay, which is typical of the
cherry-picking approach to Emerson modeled by Cavell and his
allies. But let’s stick with “Power” to see what Emerson actually
argues there. Later in that essay, which is a tribute to healthy power
in human activity, Emerson admits that “I have not forgotten that
there are [more] sublime considerations which limit the value of
talent and superficial success [meaning “health”]”: In effect,
Emerson has not forgotten that “ethics and humanity” are needed
to dilute those “swarthy juices.” He adds, “I adjourn what I have to
say on this topic to the chapters on Culture and Worship”
(Emerson, 1983, p. 985), two other chapters in Conduct. Turn from
“Power” to those chapters (as Emerson asks us to do) and, sure
enough, we find Emerson’s “ethics and humanity” explicated. In
“Culture,” Emerson reviews different ethical and humane methods
of moderating our raw, healthy power. “The antidotes against this
organic egotism” (i.e., healthy power) are “books, travel, society,
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solitude” (Emerson, 1983, p. 1019). Emerson then recommends
books in precisely that reverential mode neglected by Boatright
and Faust:
Books, as containing the finest records of human wit, must always
enter into our notion of culture. The best heads that ever existed,
Pericles, Plato, Julius Caesar, Shakspeare, Goethe, Milton, were
well-read, universally educated men, and quite too wise to undervalue
letters. . . . We look that a great man should be a good reader, or in
proportion to the spontaneous power should be the assimilating
power. (Emerson, 1983, p. 1020)

Much more is stated in “Culture” about books “containing”
truths, and reading’s passive “assimilating power” as a check on
health or “the spontaneous power”; we are also urged to read
specific authors of “transcendent superiority” (e.g., Shakespeare,
Plato). All of this flies in the face of Boatright and Faust’s misleading suggestion that Emerson recommends only irreverent reading.
Finally, “Culture” itself ultimately recommends not just books
but “solitude” as the most important check on the raw growth
described in “Power.” Why? Because in private we can cultivate a
self focused on the public: “The saint and poet seek privacy to ends
the most public and universal,” he writes, “and it is the secret of
culture, to interest the man more in his public, than in his private
quality” (Emerson, 1983, p. 1029). In “Worship” (which, again,
Emerson in “Power” asked that we consult), he assures us that we
can retreat to our private selves with confidence that our thoughts
shall be public:
The builder of heaven has not so ill constructed his creature as that the
religion, that is, the public nature, should fall out: the public and the
private element . . . adhere to every soul. . . . God builds his temple in
the heart on the ruins of churches and religions [i.e., sectarianism]. (p.
1056)

And so, in short, by following Emerson’s reasoning not just in
one sentence from “Power” but in that essay as a whole and then in
the two other essays to which Emerson explicitly directs us, we
learn that our growth—and implicitly our reading in pursuit of
growth—does not lead to an “intellectual free-for-all” (Boatright &
Faust, 2013, p. 5) because, frankly, we each have a soul (“God[’s] . . .
temple” [Emerson, 1983, p. 1056]) that, once free of sectarianism,
keeps us focused on “the public nature” (p. 1056): that is, on
transcendental equality. It remains to consider the two reading
lessons this more reverent Emerson offers us.

Repair to the Lamps and Rake the Language
An initial way to characterize Boatright and Faust’s misrepresentation of Emerson is to say they overemphasize the “centrifugence” in
Emerson’s writing and neglect the “centripetence”: that is, they
emphasize how Emerson describes forces driving us away from the
center but ignore how he also describes forces pulling us back.
These two terms occur fairly often in Emerson’s writings; usually
he uses them to indicate the importance of balance, as with the
seesaw metaphor from “Uses of Great Men” and cited by Boatright
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and Faust (2013, p. 3). But to focus on just the push or the pull, or
even the push and the pull, in Emerson’s depictions of various
natural and social phenomena is to miss the bigger point he is
almost always making. That point is that all of these natural and
social laws—laws like that of centrifugence and centripetence—are
echoes of a more fundamental moral law in the universe, as he
wrote in the 1867 “Progress of Culture.”
The laws above are sisters of the laws below. Shall we study the
mathematics of the sphere, and not its causal essence also? Nature is a
fable whose moral blazes through it. There is no use in Copernicus if
the robust periodicity of the solar system does not show its equal
perfection in the mental sphere, the periodicity, the compensatory
errors, the grand reactions. I shall never believe that centrifugence and
centripetence balance, unless mind heats and meliorates, as well as the
surface and soil of the globe. (Emerson, 1903–1904,Volume 8, p. 223)

“There is no use” for this natural principle, Emerson contends,
unless we recall the “equal perfection in the mental sphere”; he will
“never believe” in natural balance unless our “mind” balances as
well. Emerson had an indomitable faith that within each of us is an
unseen moral power that is the “sister” of the seen natural power;
this is why he repeatedly insisted that by “self-reliance” he meant
“God-reliance” (Malachuk, 2011, pp. 284–285). This leads to the
first of the two reading lessons with which this response will
conclude.
That first lesson could be called “repairing to the lamps,” as
suggested by the passage from “The American Scholar” cited
above: that is, when we “can read God directly” there’s no need for
books, but when we cannot we must “repair to the lamps . . . to
guide our steps to the East again” (Emerson, 1983, p. 58). Repairing
to the lamps means reading to confirm the moral law. That
Emerson was convinced that truly literate people are able to grasp
the moral law through reading is implied, for example, in his
journal response to the passage of that “filthy enactment,” the
Fugitive Slave Law in 1850. What most astounded Emerson, he
confessed to himself, is that this law was “made in the 19th Century,
by people who could read and write” (Emerson, 1995, p. xxxviii).
The architects of the Fugitive Slave Law were in Emerson’s view
functionally illiterate, for they were blind to the moral law that true
readers will always grasp when they read. We see this same
conviction when Emerson later meditated on the righteousness of
John Brown’s December 1859 raid on Harpers Ferry to initiate the
end of the moral evil of slavery. In his January 1860 eulogy to
Brown, Emerson observed that “every thing that is said [emphasis
added] of him leaves people a little dissatisfied; but as soon as they
read [emphasis added] his own speeches and letters they are
heartily contented” (p. 121, my emphasis). Brown, in Emerson’s
view, had hold of the moral law: He understood transcendental
equality. Once people stopped talking about Brown and started
reading his writings, they, too, grasped that law.
Looking beyond the isolated sentences Boatright and Faust
(2013) provide to the larger arguments of which they are a part, we
find this first lesson repeated again and again. For example,
Boatright and Faust cite Emerson’s point in “Spiritual Laws” (1841)
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that “‘the ancestor to every action is a thought’” (p. 3) as proof of
that Emerson understood reading to be “an active enterprise where
ideas coagulate, repel, and bifurcate” (p. 3). This is not accurate. For
Emerson in “Spiritual Laws,” behind actions are thoughts, as
Boatright and Faust contend, but those thoughts, in Emerson’s
argument, do not repel and bifurcate but instead stem from one
thought: that there is a moral law, or “God.” Emerson ends
“Spiritual Laws” with this example, its gentle humor about Irish
domestic workers dated but its lesson clear:
Let a man believe in God, and not in names and places and persons.
Let the great soul incarnated in some woman’s form, poor and sad and
single, in some Dolly or Joan, go out to service and sweep chambers
and scour floors, and its effulgent daybeams cannot be muffled or hid,
but to sweep and scour will instantly appear supreme and beautiful
actions, the top and radiance of human life, and all people will get
mops and brooms; until, lo! suddenly the great soul has enshrined itself
in some other form and done some other deed, and that is now the
flower and head of all living nature. (Emerson, 1983, p. 323)

Reading or witnessing the various deeds of various self-reliant
(i.e., God-reliant) people, “we know the authentic effects of the true
fire through every one of its million disguises” (p. 323). Similarly,
Boatright and Faust (2013) suggest that when Emerson writes in
“The Sovereignty of Ethics” (1878) that “‘we are learning not to fear
truth’” (p. 8) he means that we must “challenge it [and] prevent the
circulation of unchecked knowledge and serve as agents for change
and progress” (p. 8). Again, Emerson is recommending we “not . . .
fear truth” (p. 8) in the sense of accepting that truth, not challenging it. Later in the same essay, Emerson specifically praises the
man who has accustomed himself to look at all his circumstances as
very mutable, to carry his possessions, his relations to persons, and
even his opinions, in his hand, and in all these to pierce to the principle
and moral law, and everywhere to find that,—has put himself out of
the reach of all skepticism. (Emerson 1903–1904, Volume 10,
p. 213–214)

Skeptics fear the truth of the moral law, and Emerson here counsels
the opposite.
Perhaps the best place to learn Emerson’s first reading lesson,
however, is in his antislavery writings, the key to Emerson’s
philosophy of democracy. Reading about slavery, Emerson
consistently concluded that the moral law of transcendental
equality forbids slavery. As Emerson wrote in this 1841 “Lecture on
the Times,” “If I treat all men as gods, how to me can there be such a
thing as a slave?” (Emerson, 1983, p. 164). By the 1850s, Emerson
was describing white American blindness to this moral law as
“skepticism” or “atheism” or a “metaphysical debility” (as cited in
Malachuk, 2011, p. 280). “Truth exists,” Emerson declared in one
impassioned 1855 address, “though all men should deny it”
(Emerson, 1995, p. 102). The appeal of John Brown to Emerson was
Brown’s ability to “read” this moral law, unlike those judges who in
reading only the human laws upheld the constitutionality of the
Fugitive Slave Law. These judges were functionally illiterate, in
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Emerson’s view, for they saw only the forms and not the reality—
the moral law—behind the forms: As he put it in an 1859 address,
“[John Brown] saw how deceptive the forms are [but] the judges
rely on the forms, and do not, like John Brown use their eyes to see
the fact behind the forms” (p. 119).
The other way Emerson determined slavery to be wrong
exemplifies his second reading lesson, with which I will conclude.
As described by Gougeon (1995) in his “Historical Background” to
Emerson’s Antislavery Writings, in preparing for his first full address
on slavery, an 1844 celebration of the 1833 emancipation of the
slaves in the British West Indies, Emerson read dozens of books and
pamphlets, and his “extensive study of these sources had a profound effect on his understanding of slavery” (p. xxviii). In his 1844
“Address,” Emerson seems determine that we know this, too. He
dramatically recounts how through reading he himself ultimately
learned slavery was wrong.
The history of mankind interests us only as it exhibits a steady gain of
truth and right, in the incessant conflict which it records between the
material and the moral nature. From the earliest monuments it
appears that one race was victim and served the other races. [Emerson
then shows this with evidence from Egyptian temples and Herodotus
until the present.] Language must be raked, the secrets of slaughter-
houses and infamous holes that cannot front the day, must be
ransacked, to tell what negro slavery has been. . . . I am heart-sick
when I read how they came there, and how they are kept there. Their
case was left out of the mind and out of the heart of their brothers.
(Emerson, 1995, pp. 8–9)

“Language must be raked” in order that we can see the facts
about the wrongs of slavery and equality of these enslaved people,
our “brothers.” Raking the language for these facts, we can then
trust that our moral sensibility will make us “heart-sick” and
inspire us to end slavery, which Emerson did for the next two
decades until Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation in
1863.

Conclusion
While American schools will of course need to do much more,
Boatright and Faust’s (2013) recommendation of Emerson as a
model reader to students is most welcome. Boatright and Faust are
absolutely right that Emerson would heartily object to “teaching
reading so as to position young people as obedient consumers”
(p. 8), and, to the extent that their essay represents Emerson this
way, it is to be applauded. But, as shown above, Boatright and Faust
go too far when they suggest Emerson teaches us all to become
“critical makers of meaning” (p. 8). That is the position of pragmatists, and we already have lots of these kinds of readers—for
example, James, Dewey, Rorty—who can serve as role models for
students. Emerson was a transcendentalist, and his great message
was that moral “truth exists, though all men should deny it”
(Emerson, 1995, p.102). Such moral truths, in Emerson’s philosophy, are not made but found, and the two ways that readers will find
these truths are by reading intuitively—wherein our souls “repair to
the lamps” (Emerson, 1983, p. 58)—and by raking the language for
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the facts that awaken our moral sensibilities. Rather than continue
to invent an Emerson who may flatter our contemporary philosophical sensibility, let’s ponder and promote what Emerson
actually advocates; his transcendental reading lessons may be just
the ones that we require.
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